

<u>Chief Safety Officer Decision</u> (Application for Substitution, Equivalency, or Exemption)

Date:	27 Apr. (7017
C-NLOPB Reference:	2017-RQ-0029
Applicant:	Transocean Canada Drilling Services Ltd.
Applicant Reference:	TBR-RQ-008
Installation Name:	MODU Transocean Barents
Authority:	<i>Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act,</i> subsection 151(1) & section 205.069
	Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act, subsection 146(1) and section 201.66
Regulation:	Subsection 58(4) of the Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installation Regulations

Decision:

The Chief Safety Officer accepts the Applicant's proposal that side scuttles and windows on the *MODU Transocean Barents* are designed, constructed and approved in accordance with *DNV-OS-C301 - Stability and Watertight Integrity, April 2011, DNVGL-OS-C301 - Stability and Watertight Integrity, April 2011, DNVGL-OS-C301 - Stability and Watertight integrity, January 2017, the International Convention of Load lines, 1996, and the Applicant's confirmation that all windows and scuttles that may become submerged through combination of worst case damaged waterline (and a margin for wave action) are protected by internal hinged deadlights in lieu of the requirement in the <i>Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installation Regulations*.

This approval is subject to the condition that documentation for final acceptance of air gap and the effect of possible horizontal loads is to be submitted to DNVGL for review and acceptance prior to the winter season of 2018/2019.

Chief Safety Officer